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Introduction 
In response to changing world markets, intensified competition, new 
technologies, and worker demands, managers everywhere are required to 
reorganize work in important and sometimes profound ways. Such innovation, 
part of larger processes of industrial restructuring and production 
reorganization, is one of the central features of the modern workplace. But the 
new processes and impacts of work reorganization can be interpreted in 
different ways. 
In one prominent contemporary view, Japanese firms have reinvented 
production and all others will have no choice but to follow. For Womack, Jones, 
and Roos (1990), for example, the Toyota production system is paradigmatic. 
"Lean production", based on innovations such as just-in-time supply networks 
and shopfloor production teams, has proven its superiority and will now replace 
mass production and "change the world". Work will be (or at least should be) 
reorganized everywhere based on superior Japanese methods; the outcome, in 
time, should be cross-national convergence along with more interesting, 
challenging, team-based work as the superior techniques spread. 
Another view agrees that managers everywhere, in the auto industry but in 
other industries as well, are pushing new team systems of work organization on 
the Toyota model; but they are doing so to speed up and tighten control over 
their workforces, pushing toward an increasingly nightmarish outcome for 
shopfloor workers. Thus Parker and Slaughter (1988) also see potential 
convergence for new work organization, in this view around a more intense 
version of Taylorism that they call "management by stress". The saving grace in 
this view is that workers can and will rebel. Parker and Slaughter thus project a 
picture of converging managerial initiatives to promote oppressive new work 
organization such as the "team concept", accompanied by increasing shopfloor 
resistance and conflict. 
Our view is that both of these analyses, in spite of the substantial 
contributions of each, are flawed in their general orientations. The research we 
have done on the U.S., German, and Swedish auto industries (the paradigmatic 
industry both for Womack, Jones, and Roos and for Parker and Slaughter) 
shows that not only are there different roads to new work organization, but there 
are distinctly different outcomes as well. We see not convergence around a 
single model but considerable diversity; and this diversity is not only nationally 
based but is apparent in considerable variation of plant-level outcomes within 
each nation. This diversity, we believe, is not a transitory phenomenon but an 
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enduring one, as new and distinct, contending models of production and work 
organization take root in contemporary processes of industrial restructuring. 
The driving forces for organizational change are similar across and within 
nations: changing world markets, intensified competition, the rise of successful 
Japanese production models, the spread of new microelectronic technologies, 
new worker demands for more interesting and varied work. But outcomes vary 
in different political, economic and social contexts. The mistake that analysts 
such as Krafcik (1988) and Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) make is to 
downplay the importance of these contexts. We argue, by contrast, that the 
political, economic and social contexts are crucial in determining outcomes, both 
for the shape of new work organization and the accompanying prospects of "new 
industrial relations" (see also Jiirgens, Malsch, and Dohse 1989; Dankbaar 1990). 
We find no persuasive empirical grounds for the view that contemporary 
globalization means the dominance of and convergence around one model of 
production organization (see also BRIE 1991). On the contrary, we find 
significant cross-national variation, with distinct national patterns that are 
strongly influenced by the institutions of industrial relations, the role of 
organized labor, and national labor market characteristics. And not only do we 
find national patterns, we find as well considerable diversity within the national 
range of choice for particular plants, dependent on the local institutions, 
preferences, and political interactions of employers, unions, and governments.1 
It is not true, of course, that all things are possible. Japanese lean producers 
have reached levels of productivity, product quality and flexibility of product 
offering that are forcing others to respond. Western managers, for good reason, 
are adopting many new Japanese techniques. Japanese firms, especially in the 
auto industry, have made a major contribution by developing and showing the 
possibilities of highly efficient new work organization. Womack, Jones, and Roos 
have provided an important service in analyzing and calling attention to the 
elements of one prominent Japanese firm's success. 
But convergence, we argue, will be limited by national and local institutions 
and circumstances; patterns of diversity in production and work organization will 
persist, even as successful Western producers reach Japanese levels of efficiency. 
1 We are not arguing that organizational transfer is impossible. NUMMI and other 
Japanese transplants have shown that transfer is indeed possible, especially when 
Japanese management is part of the transfer (Florida and Kennedy 1991). As a general 
rule, however, we argue that national and local contexts will shape distinctive national 
and local patterns. 
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Sources of Diversity 
Why do we find such cross-national, cross-firm, and intranational 
differences in contemporary work reorganization? The answer is because 
politics, industrial relations institutions, union and firm strategies, and labor 
market conditions all matter. This is a perspective that has informed much of the 
best recent work on industrial relations and new work organization (such as 
Sabel 1982; Katz, and Sabel 1985; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Jurgens, 
N
 Malsch, and Dohse 1989; Pontusson 1990; Locke 1990; Thelen 1991). It is a 
perspective that is worth reemphasizing as we enter a post-Fordist era in which 
the natural inclination for researchers and analysts may be to seek to define a 
sweeping new paradigm of "best practice". 
If one accepts the conclusion that contrasting political, economic, and social 
contexts lead to different shopfloor forms of organization, the next and more 
difficult step is to specify the particular factors leading to particular outcomes. In 
other words, how do we explain the differences? We need testable propositions 
that specify interrelationships and that can be applied broadly, across nations 
and industries. A full set of hypotheses is beyond the scope of this article; but 
the following are examples of propositions, suitable for wider testing, that are 
supported by the evidence presented here. 
1. Where unions are integrated in management decision-making processes through legal or 
bargained institutions of codetermination, unions in the current period of work 
reorganization develop proactive strategies to influence the shape of new organization. 
The result is negotiated solutions: new shopfloor organization takes shape in a 
bargaining process between labor and management. One can expect in these cases that 
while some aspects of lean production will be adopted for efficiency purposes, other 
human-centered concerns that are not part of the lean system (such as longer cycle 
times, more autonomy for work groups, and elected group leaders) will also be 
incorporated. This pattern can be seen in Sweden and Germany. 
2. Where unions have long established arm's-length relations with employers and no 
formal rights in management decision making, unions face a choice between 
collaboration and opposition but are unable to play a proactive role in the shape of new 
work organization (at least until the arm's-length relation is substantially changed). 
Management will push for implementation of its own team concepts (heavily influenced 
by Japanese/lean models). The transition to new work organization will be rocky as 
management encounters a patchwork pattern of acceptance and rejection within the 
workforce, as the U.S. experience indicates. 
3. The specific form and implementation of new work organization is linked not only to 
industrial relations but to other factors such as national and local labor market 
conditions. The drive to implement human-centered forms of work organization is 
stronger in tight labor markets, where competition for labor is based not only on wages 
but on the quality of jobs. In loose, low-skilled labor markets, new forms of work 
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organization are less necessary to attract labor, leaving room either for lower skilled, 
traditional work organization or for lean production.2 
4. There is a link between labor-market incentives for work reorganization and the 
national (and local) vocational training system. If such a system produces high skills as a 
"public good", the spread of human-centered work organization based on high skills 
content becomes more probable. Contemporary Swedish and German experience 
provides evidence for this claim. 
These propositions emphasize both institutional and economic variables 
(see also Cole 1985, who identifies organized labor and labor market 
circumstances as key variables in determining the success of "small group 
activities"). Indeed we argue that both markets and established institutions are 
critical in determining the shape of new production and work organization in 
this period of major transition and restructuring. 
As evidence both for our general argument and specific hypotheses, we 
present summaries of our case studies of organizational innovation in the U.S., 
German and Swedish auto industries.3 To provide focus for this presentation, we 
emphasize the path-breaking arrival, at auto plants of all three of these 
countries, of team and group forms of shopfloor organization, where the 
isolated, individual regimentation of traditional mass production once held sway. 
Japanese-style Teams and Homegrown Solutions in the U.S. 
The early groundwork for the coming of team organization in the U.S. auto 
industry was laid at GM in the 1970s: in widespread Quality of Working Life 
experiments and in GM efforts to introduce team organization at non-union 
plants in the South (Katz 1985, pp. 73-104). Both initiatives represented efforts 
to resolve shopfloor worker discontent, improve labor-management relations (in 
an industry notorious for relations of "armed truce"), tap shopfloor workers' 
ideas and thereby improve workforce morale, productivity and product quality. 
But the big push came in the 1980s. The GM-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, 
California, known as NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.), proved 
that the introduction of Japanese-style teams was possible in an American 
setting, even with an established American workforce and union (the United 
Auto Workers). 
2 Successful Japanese transplants in the U.S. make it clear that labor markets with 
abundant skills are not necessary for the success of Toyotism/lean production. 
3 Although our case studies are of the auto industry, the hypotheses are of a general 
nature and should apply across a range of industries. We look here at the auto industry 
as one important test of our claims. 
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The plight of the U.S. auto industry in the wake of the 1978-79 oil shock 
and 1980-82 recession is well known (Altshuler et al. 1984; Quinn 1989). Market 
shares of Japanese firms rose rapidly while the sales of U.S. firms dropped, 
plants closed, and employment in the industry plunged. Japanese firms, it turned 
out, had developed enormous cost advantages (for cars of similar or superior 
quality) over U.S. firms, advantages which to a significant degree could be traced 
to innovations in production organization. It was in this context, as U.S. 
managers sought to imitate just-in-time, outsourcing and quality circle (among 
other) strategies, that they were suddenly presented, in 1984-85, with the 
successful "demonstration plant" NUMMI model. 
NUMMI is a Toyota-run plant from which GM has made a major effort to 
learn.4 There are many aspects of NUMMFs success (just as there are for the 
Toyota production system from which NUMMI is derived), but a key ingredient 
is the thorough-going organization of the plant workforce into shopfloor 
production teams. At NUMMI, workers are organized into teams typically 
composed of four members and a team leader. Although jobs are enriched 
through the teams for workers where the technology is most advanced (as in the 
stamping plant), most workers, especially in final assembly, do repetitive, 
routine, and highly standardized work in short cycles (about one minute). They 
rotate jobs within the teams, include inspection and some minor repair and 
machine maintenance within the teams, and meet every two weeks for half an 
hour to discuss production problems and suggest improvements. Although the 
system has been referred to as "team Taylorism" (Wood 1986) and "management 
by stress" (Parker and Slaughter 1988), union election results from 1986 to 1990 
favored the cooperation-oriented incumbent leadership. The local UAW, in fact, 
led by former union militants from the earlier GM plant at the same site, has 
been well integrated into a new system of consensual labor-management 
relations; workers received employment security in return for new functional 
flexibility and the elimination of most job classifications. 
But NUMMI is no workers' Nirvana: in 1991 elections, opposition 
candidates won several top local union positions. Even supporters of the 
(former) opposition, however, who criticize the constant pressure to work harder 
and faster, claim to prefer NUMMI to the highly adversarial, low morale, work-
fragmented GM system in which most NUMMI employees formerly worked. In 
the year following those elections, the cooperative, integrated labor-
4 Case study research on NUMMI and the other U.S. auto plants mentioned below is 
based on intensive interviews conducted at each plant between 1987 and 1989 (see also 
Turner 1991, pp. 31-90). 
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management relationship has persisted. An accurate evaluation of NUMMI 
should therefore be two-sided: on the positive side, high productivity and 
product quality, employment security for the workforce, and work that on the 
whole is probably more satisfying and equally apportioned than before; on the 
negative side, very limited team autonomy (at least in production), short cycle 
times composed largely of repetitive tasks, and constant "no buffer" pressure on 
the workforce. 
But NUMMI, although it may be the model to which many managers 
aspire, is far from the whole story of new work organization in the U.S. auto 
industry. Big Three auto firm management has been notoriously slow and only 
occasionally successful at spreading the lessons of NUMMI. Katz, Kochan, and 
Keefe (1988), for example, found no positive correlation between team 
organization at U.S. auto plants and good performance (such as productivity). 
Managers have often avoided the risks of change, even when prime 
opportunities have presented themselves; and when they have initiated major 
team organization campaigns, they have often pursued counterproductive 
implementation strategies that have resulted in failure. 
At an assembly plant in Van Nuys, California, GM made a major effort to 
transfer the lessons of NUMMI.5 Management, however, pursued 
reorganization in a typically old-fashioned, heavy-handed way which polarized 
the workforce and undermined the possibility of new labor-management trust 
and successful teamwork. The plant manager negotiated a local "team concept" 
agreement in 1986 with the cooperative wing of the local union leadership. But 
the agreement was rejected by the workforce; only after heavy pressure and 
threats of plant closing did the workers finally ratify on a later vote. Team 
organization on the NUMMI model was then implemented throughout the plant 
in 1987 in a polarized atmosphere; and management wasted the opportunity and 
support it did have by its own failure to live up to promises of a new and more 
humane management style. The experiment struggled gamely along, supported 
by many but undermined as well by others within the ranks of both management 
and workforce, until the announcement was finally made in 1991 that the plant 
was scheduled for permanent closing. 
In 1984, GM opened its Hamtramck flagship plant in Detroit to great 
fanfare about the revolutionary combination of new work organization 
(shopfloor teams, new human relations) and advanced assembly technology. 
5 For more on the introduction of teams at Van Nuys, see Mann 1987, pp. 219ff. and 
Turner 1991, pp. 62-70. For a comparison od NUMMI and Van Nuys, see Brown and 
Reich 1989. 
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Although all workers received some training in the new system and at least 
enough "organizational development" to raise their hopes, expectations were 
soon dashed when production pressure mounted in the early months. Managers 
reverted to their old ways, sacrificing new concepts such as job rotation, pay-for-
knowledge, and substantial team participation in the push to produce. By 1989, a 
union opposition group was strong enough to ride the crest of disillusionment 
and anger into office. Hard negotiations followed, centered around union 
demands that management fulfill human-side promises of the new system; by 
1990, prospects improved for a team system that included short cycle times and 
limited team autonomy on the one hand but job rotation, team meetings, and 
improved worker input and labor-management relations on the other hand. 
The variety of outcomes for innovation at GM plants remained wide 
throughout the 1980s and into the new decade. At plants in Lansing and 
Lordstown, for example, management and labor initiated wide-ranging "joint" 
cooperative processes that included grouping workers into teams. Although 
cycle time remained short and team autonomy limited, these new processes 
showed promise for shopfloor innovations such as job rotation and worker 
involvement while protecting traditional union bases of influence (such as 
seniority rights - in contrast to NUMMI). Workers at Lordstown called their 
teams "groups", to emphasize that this was not the Japanese or NUMMI team 
concept but rather a distinct and evolving "homegrown" solution to the need for 
new work organization and engaged labor-management relations. And at 
Saturn, labor and management collaborated from the start in the conceptual and 
physical building of a new plant, to establish yet another, more thorough-going 
model of distinctly American work reorganization and labor-management 
partnership. 
Diversity is even greater within the U.S. auto case when we consider 
Chrysler, Ford, and the Japanese transplants. At Chrysler, management has 
implemented "modern operating agreements", including team organization, at 
some plants but not at others (depending in part on workforce/union 
resistance). Ford had the best production results of the Big Three in the mid-to-
late 1980s, but moved slowly in the introduction of teams (wisely seeking to 
avoid the problems associated with GM's often rushed implementation). And 
the Japanese transplants, except for the joint ventures, have stayed non-union 
and have implemented team organization throughout their plants, with positive 
results for productivity and product quality (Florida and Kenney 1991). 
In the U.S. auto industry, therefore, the most obvious fact concerning new 
work organization is the great diversity of plant-level outcomes. In spite of 
widespread initiatives on the part of management and a general willingness on 
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the part of the national union and many local unions to cooperate, the overall 
picture for the Big Three is of a very rocky transition that has yet to yield 
consistently successful results. Traditional ways die hard, and innovation failure 
has probably been more widespread than innovation success. Milkman (1991) 
argues persuasively that the failure to move decisively toward a "new social 
contract" that would include appropriate work organization is rooted above all in 
management's bureaucratic inertia. U.S. auto industry management has on the 
whole failed to reform itself adequately for the tasks at hand, while the UAW, 
still a strong union but within a seriously declining labor movement, has so far 
shown a limited capacity to develop its own concepts and push management 
toward successful work reorganization. 
Of the three country cases we consider, however, the U.S. has moved the 
farthest toward Toyota-style lean production. 
The Coming of Group Work in the German Auto Industry 
In comparison to the U.S. case, the coming of new work organization, 
including the current move toward Gruppenarbeit (group work), has been slow, 
smooth and fairly regularized throughout the German auto industry. In response 
to economic recession, intensified competition and the export challenge of 
Japanese firms, German managers since the 1970s have moved to rationalize 
production. In so doing, they have introduced new technology and work 
organization that has included speed-up and deskilling for some production 
workers as well as "new production concepts" for others (Jiirgens, Malsch, and 
Dohse 1989). The latter is especially associated with advanced technology and in 
many cases has meant a reintegration of tasks and a shift away from assembly-
line fragmentation to more conceptual work such as machine monitoring (Kern 
and Schumann 1984; 1987). 
At the same time, building on the union/SPD campaign for the 
"humanization of work" in the 1970s, the German metalworkers union (IG 
Metall) since the early 1980s has developed and actively negotiated for its own 
concepts of group work (Muster 1988; Roth and Kohl 1988; Turner 1991, pp. 
111-17). In the auto industry, this union campaign accelerated after 1985 and has 
laid the basis for labor-management negotiation and the contemporary spread 
of group work at major assembly plants. In contrast to both the U.S. and 
Swedish cases, workers' interest representation (IG Metall and works councils) 
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in the German auto industry has played a leading role in designing group work 
concepts and promoting their implementation.6 
The core ideas of union-promoted group work were developed at IG Metall 
headquarters in Frankfurt in the early-to-mid 1980s. Building on past research 
and experiments from the humanization campaign, union representatives and 
researchers developed group work concepts in response to works council, local 
union and member complaints about the effects on the workforce of 
management's rationalization drive. In a back-and-forth dialogue between union 
and works councils of the major auto assembly plants, union thinking crystallized 
around 1986-87 in the following 12 principles of group work:7 (1) a broad 
assignment of varying tasks for the group (including long cycle times); (2) group 
competence and authority in decision making in such areas as job rotation, 
division of work, quality control, and training needs; (3) decentralization of the 
plant decision-making structure; (4) selection of production organization and 
technology suitable for group work (based on decentralized technology and 
production concepts); (5) equal pay for group members; (6) equal opportunity 
for all, including special training where necessary for the disabled and the 
socially disadvantaged, to participate in group work ("group work as solidaristic 
work organization"); (7) support for the personal and occupational development 
of individuals and the group; (8) regular group meetings, at least one hour per 
week; (9) representation of group interests within the established plant system of 
interest representation; (10) voluntary participation in the groups; (11) pilot 
projects to test the functioning of group work before broader implementation; 
and (12) a joint steering committee at the firm level, with equal labor and 
management representation, to oversee and coordinate the implementation of 
group work and the activities of the groups. 
IG Metall argued that group work could serve management interests in 
cutting costs and raising productivity while at the same time raising skill levels 
6 In contrast to both the U.S. and Sweden, Germany has a dual system composed on the 
one hand of 16 major industrial unions, engaged in regional bargaining with centralized 
employer associations, and on the other hand a separate structure of legally mandated 
works councils, with information, consultation, and codetermination rights in the 
workplace. Although works councils are elected by the entire workforce, blue and white 
collar, at each workplace and have no formal relationship to unions, most works 
councilors are union members. The tight linkage between union and works council is 
especially pronounced in the auto industry. 
7 Based on a summary translation of Muster and Wannoffel 1989, pp. 39-54. See also 
Turner 1991, pp. 113-114. For an updated version and general discussion, see Hans-
Bdckler-Stiftung/IG Metall 1992. 
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and making work more interesting and "human". High skill levels in the German 
workforce, promoted by an extensive, national vocational education system 
already in place, would make possible the widespread introduction of skilled 
group work. By 1987, works councils at most of the West German auto assembly 
plants had adopted statements of policy endorsing group work, based on the 
twelve principles or something similar, and had entered into negotiations with 
management to establish pilot projects and prepare for broader implementation. 
Management, for the most part, disregarded works council suggestions on group 
work until around 1986, when NUMMI and other examples (such as the 
Austrian GM plant at Aspern) began to drive home the potential contribution of 
shopfloor teamwork. In a reverse situation to the U.S. case, managers just 
beginning to develop their own thinking found union group work concepts 
already on the bargaining table. As negotiations proceeded and pilot projects 
spread in the late 1980s, the actual shape of new group or team organization 
emerged from processes of compromise between the union's maximal position 
and developing employer notions (favoring a more NUMMI-style approach 
with, for example, less autonomy for the groups). 
At VW, for example, substantial pilot projects were established at the 
Emden and Salzgitter plants as well as at the VW subsidiary Audi.8 In 1988, the 
VW general works council at Wolfsburg endorsed group work as its vision of 
future work organization in the auto industry, a vision addressing both 
production needs (flexibility, productivity, a highly skilled workforce) and a 
union-backed democratic workplace culture (Riffel and Muster 1989). In 1989, 
negotiations with management began in earnest for the establishment of new 
pilot projects and the gradual spread of group work throughout the VW plants. 
Both works council and management faced problems in this effort, both in their 
relations with each other (and their contending, if in some ways overlapping, 
viewpoints) and in their attempts, especially by the works council, to elicit 
shopfloor support. 
But management, union and works council are all strong and well organized 
at VW. One can predict (and already see the outlines of) lengthy processes of 
negotiation accompanied by fairly smooth and gradual implementation of group 
work at the VW plants. The works council won't get all that it is asking for in the 
design of new work organization. But it does speak with a consistent and 
proactive voice, backed by formal rights (in the Works Constitution Act) to 
8 Case study presentations of VW, Ford and Opel in Germany are based largely on 
interviews conducted at the plants in 1989-89. For more detail, see Turner 1991, pp. 117-
148. 
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information, consultation and participation in management decision making.9 
The works council will get some of what it seeks, including the preservation of its 
own important position at VW, and the path will be cleared for implementation. 
Group work, we predict, will be quite different at VW from teamwork at 
NUMMI or the other American plants considered above, and will include more 
"human-centered" features such as longer cycle time and more group 
autonomy.10 One can see the outlines of such innovative work organization 
emerging at the new VW plant at Mosel in the eastern state of Saxony (Jurgens, 
Klinzing, and Turner 1991, pp. 23-29). 
Similar processes are underway at Ford and Opel in Germany. At Ford, for 
example, the works council countered management plans to strip labor from a 
new advanced technology installation (in the tool-and-die plant) with its own 
proposal for group work. After hard bargaining, management accepted the plan 
in 1987 and set up a group work experiment that became a model for the 
integration of computer room programming and shopfloor machine monitoring. 
And at Opel, the first German auto industry agreement for the firm-wide 
implementation of group work was signed in early 1991 between management 
and the general works council.11 Building on pilot projects that included 1,700 
Opel workers, labor and management agreed to full implementation of group 
work by 1993 in all Opel plants. The design of the groups is based to a significant 
degree on IG Metall concepts, including 8-15 members at vaiying skill levels, 
considerable group autonomy in job design and the organization of assigned 
work, a major commitment to training within the groups, pay raises for all (three 
per cent on the average along with this agreement), elected group leaders, and 
group meetings for one hour per week. Opel management expects that the 
added costs of group work will be more than offset by the gains in productivity. 
And Mercedes Benz announced the implementation of negotiated group work 
for 10,000 workers in 1992, to expand to include half the workforce by 1995. 
In contrast to the U.S. case, processes and outcomes for group work appear 
fairly regularized throughout the German auto industry. The relatively narrow 
9 For more detail on the specific nature of these rights, see Turner 1991, pp. 98-99. 
10 Negotiations for group work at Wolfsburg have recently taken a back seat to other issues 
(such as employment security, VW investment in eastern Germany and Czeckoslovakia, 
and the building of a cross-national Euro-works council at VW). Wolfsburg works 
councillors, nonetheless, are working closely with and watching carefully the more 
advanced efforts to build plant-wide group work both at VW-Salzgitter and at Mosel. 
11 European Industrial Relations Review 210, July 1991, pp. 11-12; Betriebsvereinbarung 
Nr. 179: "Gruppenarbeit", Adam Opel AG and the Opel General Works Council, 
Riisselsheim. 
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range of outcomes results above all from the IG MetalFs coordinating role in the 
development and promotion of group work concepts and bargaining strategies. 
The works councils at most German auto assembly plants adopted the concepts 
and put them on the bargaining table around the same time. And everywhere in 
the auto industry, management is restricted in what it can do unilaterally given 
substantial works council codetermination rights. We can expect that the 1991 
agreement at Opel will be followed by similar agreements at VW and Ford, and 
that group work in the German auto industry will continue to be implemented in 
comparatively smooth processes based on negotiated labor-management 
agreement.12 
A Long History of Group Work in the Swedish Auto Industry 
As in Germany and the U.S., the current Swedish experience with work 
reorganization has a history that stretches back two decades or more.13 Until the 
1970s, Swedish industrial relations were based largely on a broad agreement 
between the social partners; with the Saltsjobaden agreement of 1938, unions 
and employers each recognized the other's legitimacy and agreed to strive for 
the peaceful settlement of industrial conflicts, with employers retaining the 
exclusive right to organize production at the workplace. Wage bargaining 
occurred at the central level, while a "hands-off' approach for government in 
industrial relations prevailed. The first attempts at fundamental work 
reorganization came from certain managers who adopted "social-technical 
system analysis" ideas in order to reduce high turnover and absenteeism rates.14 
Organized labor, however, considered the early management approach too 
individualistic, preferring a more collective concept of industrial democracy. 
During the 1970s, unions thus engaged in a broad "legal offensive" which left 
12 Economic recession and the continuing crisis of German unification, however, may well 
speed up processes of work reorganization. Just as VW looks at Mosel, so Opel looks at 
its innovative lean plant at Eisenach for clues about how to promote reform. 
13 The material in this section is based on intensive interviews and other research at 
Swedish auto plants since the mid-1980s. For more detail, see Auer and Riegler 1990a 
and 1990b. 
14 These ideas were developed by experts at the Tavistock Institute in Britain (Trist and 
Bamforth) and then elaborated by Scandinavian researchers such as Thorsrud (1972). 
Until the 1970s, Swedish industrial relations were based largely on the Saltsjobaden 
agreement of 1938, in which employers and unions agreed to strive for the peaceful 
settlement of industrial conflicts and employers retained the exclusive right to organize 
production at the workplace. There was no German-style dual system and no 
codetermination until the 1970s. 
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Swedish industrial relations more extensively regulated by the early 1980s. 
Included in the new legislation was the law on codetermination, passed in 1976, 
which established union rights to information, consultation and participation in 
management decision making at the plant and firm levels. A central-level 
collective bargaining agreement in 1982, between LO (the blue-collar 
federation), TCO (white-collar) and SAF (the employers' association), 
established a framework for the implementation of codetermination, which was 
then supplemented by specific union-employer agreements such as the one at 
Volvo in 1984. 
The union legal campaign brought the movement for new work 
organization to a slowdown by the late 1970s. Although the experiences of that 
first period did not spread, some of them, such as innovations at the Volvo 
Kalmar plant beginning in 1974, nonetheless set the pace for further 
developments. 
After a period of turmoil in industrial relations, brought on in part by the 
union legal offensive and the campaign for wage earner funds (interpreted by 
many as the end of the "Swedish model" of peaceful bargaining for structural 
change; Auer 1983), a new period of work reorganization began around the mid-
1980s. 
The new drive for changes in work organization was again initiated by 
management. This time, however, the changes were founded less on 
humanization-of-work than on efficiency concerns, aimed at reforming a 
bureaucratic, centrally controlled organization. Although changes were now 
legitimized on efficiency grounds, they were not opposed by the unions. Labor's 
new approach was based in large part on the success of the legal offensive and 
the new union rights to full information and consultation on all shopfloor 
matters. The metalworkers' union (including the auto workers) began to develop 
labor strategies for organizational change, which by the mid-1980s led to 
proposals for "good work" which included group-work (Metalarbetareforbundet 
1985). Union group work concepts paralleled the basic group work plans already 
developed by management, which had continued to discuss and implement 
changes even during the period of the legal offensive. Work groups were 
designed to execute regular production work in reorganized plants, based on 
ideas of product shops, flow groups and the general notion that "small is 
surveyable" (Agur6n and Edgren 1980). Such planning aimed at creating highly 
integrated teams of production workers engaged in job rotation, enlargement 
and enrichment. Production groups of the Swedish kind, in addition to direct 
production work, take on extensive tasks such as maintenance of equipment and 
tools, material planning, "housekeeping" of the group area, distributing work 
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assignments among the group members, and vacation planning. Usually a group 
leader is elected, and leadership can rotate among group members. Wage 
incentives (pay for knowledge of tasks within the group and performance pay 
based on group or plant performance) as well as flatter hierarchies accompany 
the new forms of work organization. 
A study conducted at ten plants of the Swedish car producer Volvo (Auer 
and Riegler 1990), as well as other research (Berggren 1991), shows the diversity 
of group work forms. At the new plant in Uddevalla, highly integrated teams 
each assembled a whole car; in other plants, however, a team may only be a 
group of workers executing specialized tasks under the control of a foreman 
selected by management. But in most plants there is a constant effort to push 
group work concepts further. 
Plant-level diversity in the Swedish auto industry is even greater if one takes 
into account the changes in work organization at the second Swedish car 
manufacturer, Saab. Although group work was introduced there as well, Saab 
never developed a broad strategy to diffuse the innovations as Volvo did. Some 
of the changes (as in engine production at Sodertalje) have been discontinued; 
and the new assembly plant in Malmo never represented as clear a departure 
from the assembly line as Volvo's Uddevalla plant, built around the same time 
(Berggren 1991). When GM took over Saab in 1990, management decided to 
close the new Malmo factory, believing both that capacity at the principal Saab 
site in Trollhattan was sufficient for the future and that car assembly in the new 
plant was too costly. 
Different companies, but also different plants within a company (which are 
usually run on a profit center basis and therefore have considerable autonomy 
concerning issues such as work organization) exhibit considerable diversity of 
implementation in forms of group work. It is astonishing, for example, that 
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990, pp. 101-2) put on the same level of 
"neocraftmanship" two very different Volvo plants, Uddevalla and Kalmar, when 
the latter is much closer to "lean production" than the former. 
Although at Kalmar a new assembly technique (carriers on magnetic tracks) 
was developed and the plant was divided into small workshops (group areas of 
15-20 workers each), the factory did not represent a radical departure from the 
assembly-line principle. The carriers' pace was centrally set; and earlier 
possibilities of variation afforded by buffers and dock assembly (working at 
stationary platforms) were restricted by new requirements such as just-in-time 
parts delivery. 
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Uddevalla, by contrast, started production fifteen years after Kalmar and 
afforded a radical departure from the assembly line. The entire car was 
assembled on a stationary platform by a work group of around ten members; 
without centrally controlled pacing, there was more autonomy for the groups 
and more scope to vary production speeds. For the first time, assembly work, 
typically low-skilled in auto assembly plants, was upgraded: workers had to 
complete sixteen months of training before becoming full-fledged assembly 
workers at Uddevalla.15 
A close look at work organization in the Swedish auto industry thus shows 
very different forms even at plants considered innovative within the same firm. 
The form of implementation appears to depend on a variety of factors such as 
available skills in local labor markets. Restrictions or incentives for 
implementation, for example, are set by the availability of both skilled labor and 
alternative jobs in the area, with important effects on turnover rates. 
In comparison to the other countries in our study, the following national 
pattern of work reorganization in Sweden emerges. Changes are mainly 
management driven, with extensive diffusion channels (through the strong 
employer federation) to spread information and facilitate broader 
implementation of change. Management sees working groups as one element of 
a larger strategy of organizational change, to delegate responsibility for profits, 
costs and "total quality" as far down as the shopfloor level. 
The attitude of Swedish unions has changed over time from resistance to 
support for change, in part because codetermination rights were enacted in law. 
The metalworkers union in particular has in recent years developed proactive 
policies for work reorganization. Given high Swedish rates of unionization (90% 
or more) and broad union influence in the political economy, union work 
organization strategies provide an effective channel for the diffusion of group 
work. The union goal is the realization of principles of "good work", combining 
stable, well paid jobs with challenging, skills-developing assignments. 
Although goals are not the same on both sides, there is enough overlap 
between the designs of labor and management for a "modernization agreement" 
to have taken hold. A cooperative way of implementing change has developed 
which has contributed to the diffusion of experiences and new forms. 
Volvo's decision to close Uddevalla in 1993 and Kalmar in 1994 cuts the 
ground from under proponents of Swedish-style group work. But according to 
Volvo management, the decisions to close resulted not from weak performance 
but from overcapacity. It makes sense to close small final assembly plants 
15 For more on Kalmar and Uddevalla, see Auer and Riegler 1990a and 1990b. 
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(lacking body and paint shops and stamping plants) and consolidate production 
at the larger Torslanda plant and the Skovde engine plant, where group work 
innovations will continue. Just as we have seen the influence of industrial 
relations in the development of Swedish work organization, so industrial 
relations also played a role in recent decisions. The union understood the 
overcapacity problem and preferred closing the smaller plants to cuts in the 
large union stronghold at Torslanda. Managers and unionists alike are emphatic 
that the remaining plants will survive and thrive with variations of Swedish group 
work rather than lean production. 
Conclusion 
The overall picture that emerges from these national stories, based on 
empirical studies of the politics of new work organization at numerous auto 
plants, is one of rich diversity. The isolated work stations of traditional mass 
production are giving way everywhere to new forms of team or group-based 
work organization. But the politics and processes of change as well as the 
specific shape of the outcomes vary considerably within and across both nations 
and firms. Although plant-level variation is important within each national case, 
there do appear to be distinct national patterns for the processes and outcomes 
of contemporary work reorganization. 
In the U.S., we see the broadest diversity of plant-level outcomes. The drive toward team 
forms of organization is management led, inspired by a Japanese "team concept"; but 
management has often pushed its programs on reluctant and divided workforces and above all 
has failed to adequately reform itself, to play a less authoritarian, more cooperative, 
facilitatiye and inspirational role. The official union response has been to collaborate with 
management on new work organization, although at the plant level local union responses 
range from collaboration to opposition. The union has played only a minimal proactive role of 
its own, one that would promote an independent vision of the shape of new work 
organization. The overall pattern has been one that includes both widespread failure to 
reorganize successfully, especially at the dominant firm, GM, and a rocky transition toward 
Japanese-style team organization. The U.S. case provides evidence for the second hypothesis: 
that arm's-length labor-management relations result in employer dominance of work 
reorganization and a very rocky transition toward variations of lean production. 
In Germany, progress toward group work in the auto industry has been slower and more 
deliberate. Here, the union has played a strong proactive role in developing and promoting its 
own concepts of new work organization. There has been a relatively narrow range of plant-
level outcomes, marked by group work negotiations and pilot project implementation, 
although labor and management at Opel have signed a breakthrough agreement that calls for 
broad group work implementation. As employers have become more interested in team forms 
of organization since the mid-1980s, labor (through the works councils) and management have 
been negotiating the substance of group work, including some elements that could be 
considered "lean" and others that come from the union's "humanization" orientation. The 
German case provides evidence for the first and the fourth hypothesis: that institutions of 
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codetermination facilitate proactive union strategies which result in negotiated work 
reorganization; and that extensive vocational training promotes human-centered work 
organization. 
In Sweden, the overall move toward group work began early, in the 1970s, and has 
progressed through a variety of forms at various plants. The drive toward new work 
organization has for the most part been management led, as part of a drive to attract workers 
and reduce absenteeism and turnover in a full employment economy. Backed by new 
codetermination legislation and bargaining agreements, the union in recent years has moved 
toward its own engaged, proactive stance on group work, and has tipped the balance within 
management toward more autonomous, "human-centered" forms of organization that are 
quite different from Japanese team concepts. There is in effect a "modernization agreement" 
between labor and management to promote both the introduction of advanced technology 
and new forms of group work designed to be both human-centered and efficient. The Swedish 
case therefore provides evidence for the first, the third and the fourth hypothesis: that 
institutions of codetermination facilitate proactive union strategies which result in negotiated 
work reorganization; and that tight labor markets and extensive vocational training promote 
human-centered work organization. 
Our hypotheses on work reorganization are not intended to be exhaustive 
but rather to illustrate the importance of industrial relations and labor market 
circumstances for variations in new work organization. Although the evidence is 
richly suggestive, we have not proven these hypotheses, which require further 
testing in other industries and industrial societies coping with the challenges of 
work reorganization. If valid, these claims should be widely applicable in 
Western Europe and North America, and not just in the automobile industry. 
The Japanese case, by contrast, is unique as an important driving force for 
change in other countries. Although analysis of work organization in Japan is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is nonetheless clear that firms such as Toyota 
display great strengths in productivity and product quality. But Toyota is not the 
only Japanese way; there is considerable diversity within Japan, even within the 
auto industry (between, for example, Toyota and Honda). In addition, there is 
mounting evidence that contemporary work organization in Japan is changing; 
several analysts have claimed that on the shopfloor, the lean model even at 
Toyota is beginning to loosen up in response to the demands of Japanese 
workers and the need to make factory work more attractive to young workforce 
entrants (Nomura 1992).16 And Japanese work organization in all its varieties is 
very much a product of its own institutional, historical and labor market context. 
Enterprise unions grease the wheels of cooperative labor-management relations 
16 And at the new Honda plant in Tochigi, Siegfried Roth reports, a production system was 
introduced which for the first time did not include an assembly line and which was 
strongly influenced by the skilled worker orientation found in Germany and Scandinavia 
(Roth 1992, p. 19). 
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and team-based work organization; and enterprise unionism itself is based in 
part on past union demands such as employment security and seniority-based 
rewards (Kenney and Florida 1988, pp.127-29). 
In their seminal study of lean production, Womack, Jones, and Roos 
mention in passing that there may be many aspects of Japanese society that 
others will not want or need to adopt (1990, p. 9). One of these, which they do 
not mention and about which they say almost nothing in their book, may be 
Japanese industrial relations, in which the subordinate enterprise union 
functions in many cases as a virtual arm of management. This is in fact the 
biggest mistake that Womack, Jones, and Roos make: the failure to 
acknowledge that the Toyota production system which they laud was founded in 
part on the defeat of independent unionism in the 1950s, and that industrial 
relations is always an important part of the development of new work 
organization.17 And other important factors influencing work organization are 
beyond the decision range of individual firms: labor laws, for example, that allow 
generous leaves of absence or reduce working time, making it necessary to put 
additional personnel on the books; and tenure and mobility patterns, which may 
result in high turnover rates and in any case leave their mark on productivity and 
cost. It is precisely for reasons such as these that production organization will 
continue to look different in different national and local settings. 
Although it is true that extraordinarily efficient Japanese production 
models are driving much change in work organization practices in other 
countries, it is wrong to judge others by how closely they approximate the ideal 
type of lean production. Because political, economic and social contexts matter 
so importantly, there will be enduring and substantial cross-national and sub-
national variations in new work organization, as the evidence presented here on 
team and group work makes apparent. And there is no more apparent reason 
now than there has been in the past to assume that there is "one best way", that 
one way will in the long run necessarily prove far superior in productivity, 
product quality and worker satisfaction. Even at its high point of worldwide 
diffusion, Fordism had widely varying local forms of implementation, as 
comparative studies of factory organization have made apparent (Lutz 1977; 
17 Womack, Jones, and Roos present detailed discussions of the relations and tensions 
between firms and suppliers and between firms and dealers, but unaccountably omit any 
substantive discussion of the relations and tensions between firms and their own 
employees and unions. This omission is all the more glering because the predecessor to 
this book, the first volume produced by the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program 
which they co-authored (Altshuler et al 1984), was quite explicit in according a primary 
importance to contrasting cross-national industrial relations. 
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Maurice, Sellier, and Sylvestre 1986). And in an interesting counterpoint to the 
image of inexorably spreading lean production, Ruth Milkman has shown that 
even most Japanese producers in the U.S. continue to use traditional methods 
and have chosen not to make use of innovative NUMMI-style ways of organizing 
their workforces (Milkman 1992). 
If it is true, as we argue, that there is not necessarily one best way, 
alternative models must nonetheless successfully compete. In this essay, we have 
- juxtaposed Toyota's lean production, which we believe includes human 
downsides such as intensive work pace, high stress, long hours, short cycle times, 
limited worker independence and an absence of truly independent employee 
representation, against more human-centered German and Swedish group 
work.18 But while Toyotism has emphatically proven itself in competitive terms, 
the same is not yet true for German or Swedish group work. We think it is too 
soon to evaluate the latter nascent efforts and other current attempts at 
synthesis; but we do acknowledge, as do the relevant practitioners from both 
management and labor, that Japanese levels of productivity must be approached 
if German or Swedish group work is to succeed. 
In this regard, the building of a new VW plant at Mosel (Saxony) in eastern 
Germany is an important case. Here, VW management aims to match Japanese 
levels of productivity by combining elements of lean production with union 
group work concepts, the terms of which are negotiated and overseen by an 
elected, union-dominated works council (Jurgens, Klinzing, and Turner 1991, 
pp.23-29). Managers and unionists alike are excited about the development of 
innovations that could be spread throughout Germany. 
The important point here is that while elements of lean production are 
arriving in Germany (and many other countries as well), new work organization 
looks different in many ways from Toyotism, especially in the emphasis on 
human-centered design. Elements of new work organization — JIT, job rotation, 
skills training, elected group leaders, decision-making capacities - can in fact be 
developed and combined in different ways, resulting in more or less individual 
and group autonomy. 
Convergence theories were dominant in the social sciences in the 1950s and 
1960s, spearheaded as they were by the "industrialism" perspective of Kerr, 
Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers (1960). These theories captured part of the truth: 
that industrialized societies contain many common economic, political, social 
and organizational aspects. But the predictive power and credibility of these 
18 A more useful conceptualization would be a continuum between the two, and the ideal 
version would probably contain a synthesis of lean and human elements. 
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theories were soon swamped by persistently distinct structures of political 
economy, even within the ranks of the advanced industrial democracies (Dore 
1973; Schmitter 1974; Wilensky 1976; Zysman 1983). Even the dominant mass 
production paradigm for industrial organization always contained within it 
important cross-national (and other) variations, which became increasingly 
important with new markets and technologies since the 1970s (Piore and Sabel 
1984). 
Now, with the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe, 
economic integration in Western Europe, and the contemporary dominance of 
free-market ideology, new convergence theory becomes tempting. But 
entrenched national institutions and particular market circumstances make 
national and local diversity as important now as ever. This is especially true for 
production organization, in spite of the obvious success of lean production and 
the current widespread interest of Western managers in Japanese forms of 
organization. Firms, it is true, that cannot respond to Japanese levels of 
productivity, quality and flexibility will decline or die out altogether. 
Nonetheless, the evidence presented here indicates that although Japanese 
practices such as the team concept are widely promoted by employers in North 
America and Europe, the specific shape of new work organization will be 
significantly determined by national and local institutions, circumstances and 
negotiations. 
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